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ARE GAY RIGHTS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED? THE
PROBLEMS WITH THE QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
“Texas and [the Tarrant County College District] do not like homo-
sexuals.”  Jacqueline Gill learned this information from her depart-
ment chair at Tarrant County College in Hurst, Texas, where Gill was
a full-time temporary professor of English in 2009.1  During the inter-
view process, college officials informed her that teachers who success-
fully complete their initial one-year contract are “uniformly hired”
into available permanent positions.2  Despite receiving consistent high
praise, Gill alleged that she was the only one, and far from the least
qualified, among seven contract teachers who did not receive a full-
time offer in 2010.3  Gill’s suit asserting violations of her equal protec-
tion rights by the department chair, the divisional dean, and the col-
lege settled out of court for $160,000 in March 2012, after the
defendants’ motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings
were denied.4  In denying qualified immunity to the department chair
and dean, the judge declared that the pleadings not only established a
basis for the claim in violation of Gill’s equal protection rights, but
also because “in 2009, . . . the unconstitutionality of sexual-orientation
discrimination lacking a rational relationship to a legitimate govern-
mental aim was clearly established.”5  This ruling became an important
indicator of the actual state of civil rights for sexual minorities when it
recognized a clearly established constitutional guarantee related to
sexual orientation despite the absence of statutory protections.6
1. Gill v. Devlin, 867 F. Supp. 2d 849, 852 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
2. Id. at 851.
3. Id. at 852.
4. Gill v. Devlin and Howell, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/gill-
v-devlin-and-howell (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
5. Gill, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (emphasis added).
6. See id. at 856–57.  As of June 2014, only twenty-one states and the District of Columbia had
laws or constitutional protections against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation. Equality Maps: Employment Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/employment_non_discrimination_laws (last vis-
ited June 16, 2014).  These jurisdictions have clear, albeit not uniform, causes of action under
state law for individuals who experience discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
869
870 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:869
Government officials who are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for vio-
lating an individual’s constitutional rights are granted qualified immu-
nity when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”7  Essentially, a plaintiff can only get her day in court if she
can survive this initial obstacle of the government official’s affirmative
defense of qualified immunity.  In Gill v. Devlin, the court provided a
method to determine the existence of constitutional protection related
to sexual orientation.  It explained that by 2009, “the unconstitutional-
ity of sexual-orientation discrimination lacking a rational relationship
to a legitimate governmental aim [had been] clearly established.”8  It
also stated that by 2009 a government actor should have known that
discrimination against an individual on the basis of her sexual orienta-
tion violated her clearly established constitutional right, and that the
actor would not be entitled to qualified immunity for such an action.9
Because the “clearly established” standard applied for qualified im-
munity is a high one, when a court grants or denies the immunity it
should be demonstrating the sharp contours of a constitutional right.
But if, as the Gill court held, it was clearly established that discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation was unconstitutional, then why
did two other district court cases decided in the same year as Gill and
featuring similar claims and facts come to different outcomes than
Gill?10
Part II of this Comment provides the background for these three
cases and suggests how the courts diverged in their reasoning.11  Part
III examines the qualified immunity doctrine through the lens of the
constitutional rights associated with sexual orientation and demon-
strates problems with the doctrine.12  These problems hamper the
courts’ roles in clarifying constitutional rights and undermine the
power of Supreme Court precedent that expanded the umbrella of
constitutional protections.13  Recent developments in the qualified im-
munity doctrine provide broader protection for defendants (particu-
larly federal actors), make the standard of clearly established law
more elusive, and discourage courts from defining rights in a way that
7. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
8. Gill, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 857.
9. See id.
10. See generally Ambris v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:12CV774, 2012 WL 5874367 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 19, 2012); Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, Civil No. 10-2361 (DWF/LIB), 2012 WL 185780 (D.
Minn. Jan. 23, 2012).
11. See infra notes 19–69 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 70–213 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
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puts government actors on notice of the existence of constitutional
rights.14  Constitutional protections for sexual minorities are a sharp
lens for examining the qualified immunity doctrine because the key
Supreme Court decisions eschew the standard legal formulations asso-
ciated with the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause.15  This characteristic allows less conscientious lower courts to
skirt the key holdings or define the holdings with reference to dissent-
ing arguments.16
Part IV suggests changes that should be made to restore the pur-
pose of qualified immunity, which protects individuals from govern-
ment actors clearly violating their known rights.17  Currently the
doctrine does not allow the courts to serve society by clarifying ex-
isting constitutional rights and interpreting those rights in light of soci-
ety’s evolved appreciation for human dignity.18
II. BACKGROUND
In 2012, three different homosexual plaintiffs brought employment
discrimination claims before three different circuits.  Each reached a
different outcome.  Jacqueline Gill and the Tarrant County College
District settled after a Texas district court ruled that Gill had “plausi-
bly alleged the violation of her clearly established equal-protection
rights” and therefore denied qualified immunity to the defendants.19
Sandra Ambris had her case dismissed by an Ohio district court that
conflated her § 1983 equal protection claim with her employment dis-
crimination claim under Title VII and rejected the applicability of the
same Supreme Court decisions relied on by the Gill court.20  Lastly,
Sean Lathrop and the City of St. Cloud settled after a Minnesota dis-
trict court ordered more fact development regarding whether he had
alleged an equal protection violation.21
14. See infra notes 83–94 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 95–144 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 145–162 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 214–222 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 214–215 and accompanying text.
19. Gill v. Devlin, 867 F. Supp. 2d 849, 859 (N.D. Tex. 2012); see also Gill v. Devlin and
Howell, supra note 4.
20. Ambris v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:12CV774, 2012 WL 5874367, at *9–10 (N.D. Ohio Nov.
19, 2012); cf. Gill, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 856–57.
21. Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, Civil No. 10-2361 (DWF/LIB), 2012 WL 185780, at *11 (D.
Minn. Jan. 23, 2012); see also St. Cloud Settles Officer’s Discrimination Lawsuit, WJON (Mar. 2,
2012), http://wjon.com/st-cloud-settles-officers-discrimincation-lawsuit/.
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A. The Two Prongs of Qualified Immunity
The affirmative defense of qualified immunity arose in association
with § 1983 claims to ensure that government officials would not be
hampered by insubstantial suits.22  This doctrine shields “government
officials performing discretionary functions” from liability for civil
damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”23  However, in explaining the rationale that even one of
the highest government officials might not receive qualified immunity,
the Supreme Court has emphasized the seriousness of the need for a
measured and limited immunity for government officials: “We do not
believe that the security of the Republic will be threatened if its At-
torney General is given incentives to abide by clearly established
law.”24
The traditional qualified immunity analysis involves a two-part ob-
jective query: (1) whether the facts alleged establish the violation of a
federal statute or constitutional right; and (2) whether the right vio-
lated was a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of
which a reasonable person would have known.”25  In Pearson v. Calla-
han, the Court overturned a short-lived regime initiated by Saucier v.
Katz that required courts to first address whether there was a viola-
tion of a constitutional right, and only then address the second prong
of whether the right was clearly established.26  Under Pearson, courts
are no longer obligated to conduct a prong-one analysis if prong two
22. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1981).  Congress originally passed the law now
known as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 1871 as the first section of the “Ku Klux Klan Act.”  Enforcement
Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13; see also KAREN M. BLUM & KATHRYN R. URBONYA,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 2 (1998), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/Sect1983.pdf/$file/Sect1983.pdf.  The statute’s modern existence as a civil cause of
action against state officials who violate federal statutory or constitutional rights, regardless of
whether they also violate state-based rights, began in 1961 with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Monroe v. Pape. See id.; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171–80 (1961).  The Court
applied § 1983 claims to government agencies through Monell v. Department of Social Services of
the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), extended a similar right of action to individuals whose constitutional rights had been
violated by federal government officials.
23. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
24. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985).
25. Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818); see also Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1021–22
(9th Cir. 2009) (granting qualified immunity under the second prong, but only after finding
under the first prong that there had been a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and
explaining that it utilized both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis so that it could “provide
guidance to those charged with the difficult task of protecting child welfare within the confines
of the Fourth Amendment”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
26. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194
(2001)).
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results in there being no clearly established right.27  Therefore, § 1983
cases need not identify a constitutional right that could then become
“clearly established” by virtue of a court ruling and thereby put gov-
ernment actors on notice regarding future behavior.28
The Supreme Court has also recognized qualified immunity as an
important protection for government officials from burdensome litiga-
tion by allowing a preliminary resolution of the question of law re-
garding whether the complaint alleges a violation of “clearly
established law.”29  This means that the matter is typically ruled upon
in summary judgment or motions to dismiss, either based on the
pleadings or after narrow discovery on the immunity question alone.30
Because the value is protecting an official from frivolous litigation, the
Court has “repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving qualified
immunity questions at the earliest possible stage of litigation.”31
The “clearly established” requirement in qualified immunity analy-
sis ensures that officials were on notice that their actions could violate
an individual’s right.32  Furthermore, the Court has held that a single
specific warning is not necessary to establish the right clearly, and
neither is a general rule from a court’s decision required: “officials can
still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in
novel factual circumstances.”33  There are two options for finding
clearly established law in the absence of a statute or express constitu-
tional right: “any cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction,”
or “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable
officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful.”34
B. Romer and Lawrence: The Supreme Court Precedent
Establishing Gay Rights
An essential question raised by this Comment, then, is whether it is
clearly established law that a government actor has violated an individ-
27. Id.
28. See id. at 236–37.  It is possible for a defendant to win qualified immunity because the
right was not clearly established under the second prong, but nonetheless appeal a first-prong
holding that he violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2029
(recognizing that the defendant would thereafter be barred from the conduct held to be a viola-
tion of a constitutional right and therefore had established an injury warranting standing for
appeal).
29. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
30. See BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 22, at 87–89.
31. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per
curiam)).
32. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002).
33. Id. at 740–41 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)).
34. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
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ual’s constitutional rights when he discriminates against that individ-
ual on the basis of sexual orientation.  Two key Supreme Court cases
undergird this question. Romer v. Evans struck down a 1992 Colo-
rado constitutional amendment prohibiting all governmental action at
any level of government designed to protect gays and lesbians.35  The
Court implicitly invoked equal protection grounds for its decision, be-
ginning its opinion with an excerpt from Justice Harlan’s dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson: “the Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.’”36  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held that
private, consensual sexual activity between adults of the same sex is
protected by the Due Process Clause.37  The defendants in Lawrence
were convicted under the Texas homosexual conduct law, which
criminalized oral and anal sex between two persons of the same sex.38
The court reasoned that “[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and pri-
vate life of the individual.”39  Together, Romer and Lawrence stand
for the constitutional holdings that whether one considers the classifi-
cation of an individual as homosexual, or whether one considers that
individual’s private sexual activity, the government has no legitimate
interest in burdening individuals merely because they are homosexual
or engage in private homosexual conduct.
It is important to note that Justice Scalia’s dissents in both cases
have been influential in limiting the precedential value of both Romer
and Lawrence.40  Justice Scalia criticized the Romer majority for en-
gaging inappropriately in culture wars and argued that the challenged
amendment was a legitimate, “modest attempt by seemingly tolerant
Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores” against political
forces seeking to revise those mores.41  Because at the time Romer
was decided the Court had not yet struck down laws criminalizing sod-
omy, Justice Scalia also reasoned that laws prohibiting special protec-
tions on homosexuals were certainly constitutional if laws
criminalizing homosexual conduct were.42  Justice Scalia assailed the
Lawrence opinion for failing to apply the appropriate substantive due
35. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
36. Id. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting)).
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
38. Id. at 562–63 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003), declared unconstitu-
tional by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558).
39. Id. at 578.
40. See generally Arthur S. Leonard, Exorcising the Ghosts of Bowers v. Harwick: Uprooting
Invalid Precedents, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519 (2009); see also infra notes 145–162.
41. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 641.
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process analysis: “[N]owhere does the Court’s opinion declare that
homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due Process
Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that
would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a
‘fundamental right.’”43
C. Three Recent Sexual Orientation Discrimination Cases, Each
Applying Supreme Court Precedent Differently
Justice Scalia’s dissents aside, the majority opinions in Romer and
Lawrence form the backbone for subsequent findings like Gill of un-
constitutional discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.44  The
Gill case involved a full-time, temporary English instructor who was
told during the interview process that “instructors who successfully
complete a contract teaching term and then apply for a permanent
position are ‘uniformly hired.’”45  Gill was arguably quite successful;
she received good feedback on her teaching in the fall and she was
asked to take on teaching above her full-time load during the spring
term.46  Still, Gill’s supervisor subjected her to a “lengthy diatribe
about ‘homosexuals’ and how the Texas public views them.”47  De-
spite confirmation from the dean that he had not heard anything ad-
verse about her teaching, Gill was not invited to interview for any of
the seven open permanent instructor positions, even though the other
six temporary instructors were interviewed and hired.48
Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the court
determined that Gill had adequately pleaded that she “received treat-
ment different from that received by similarly-situated individuals and
that the unequal treatment stemmed from discriminatory intent.”49
The court then reviewed Romer, Lawrence, and the Fifth Circuit rul-
ing in Johnson v. Johnson,50 and ultimately determined that “a rea-
43. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. See infra notes 50–51.
45. Gill v. Devlin, 867 F. Supp. 2d 849, 851 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
46. Id. at 852, 856.
47. Id. at 852.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 855–56 (quoting Praylor v. Partridge, No. 7-03-CV-247-BD, 2005 WL 1528690, at *3
(N.D. Tex. June 28, 2005)).
50. Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying qualified immunity to Texas
correctional officers who allegedly denied protection from sexual assault to a prisoner because of
his sexual orientation).  The Johnson court reasoned that to deny the plaintiff protection because
of his sexual orientation “serve[d] no legitimate penological objectiv[e]” and violated the Equal
Protection Clause on a rational-basis standard. Id. at 532 (alteration in original) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)).  It is important to recognize that even though
Johnson set important Fifth Circuit precedent regarding the Equal Protection Clause’s applica-
bility to sexual orientation discrimination, the facts and outcome of the case were disastrous for
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sonable person in [the defendants’] position would have understood
that his conduct constituted sexual-orientation discrimination in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.”51
In Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, as in Gill,52 the court began with the
optional first prong of the qualified immunity analysis to evaluate
whether the plaintiff had asserted a constitutional right.53  Sean Lath-
rop was a highly commended officer in the St. Cloud Police Depart-
ment until May 2009, when the defendants, key officials in the police
department, learned that he was gay.54  After his sexual orientation
became known at work, Lathrop experienced “a ‘concerted effort’ to
paper his file with disciplinary documents in an effort to force him to
resign.”55
The court acknowledged two potential challenges to the first-prong
qualified immunity analysis: that sexual orientation implicates only a
rational-basis review, and that this claim lacked the comparators—in-
dividuals similarly situated to the plaintiff—typically required for find-
ing employment discrimination.56  It resolved the first matter by
echoing Romer, holding that the “[d]efendants have not alleged, nor
does the Court find, that any legitimate governmental concerns would
justify” the disparate treatment the plaintiff received because of his
sexual orientation.57  The court accepted the plaintiff’s assertion that
he was his own comparator: “the Department treated [him] differently
after he requested to become an openly gay officer.”58  The court re-
fused to grant the defendants qualified immunity because there were
contestable issues regarding the prong-one question of whether there
was a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.59
In Ambris v. City of Cleveland, an Ohio district court evaluated a
harbormaster’s claim of discrimination in the workplace. The court
utilized a strict reading of employment discrimination under Title VII
the plaintiff, who ultimately lost a jury verdict despite a substantial record of having been sub-
jected to rapes and other severe abuse with the full knowledge of the correctional officers. See
JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE 92–93 (2011).
51. Gill, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 856–57 (citing Johnson, 385 F.3d at 532 (“[A] state violates the
Equal Protection Clause if it disadvantages homosexuals for reasons lacking any rational rela-
tionship to legitimate governmental aims.” (alteration in original)).
52. See id. at 854.
53. Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, Civil No. 10-2361 (DWF/LIB), 2012 WL 185780, at *17 (D.
Minn. Jan. 23, 2012).
54. Id. at *1.
55. Id. at *2.
56. Id. at *6.
57. Id. at *7.
58. Id.
59. Lathrop, 2012 WL 185780, at *18–20.
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and rejected applicable circuit precedent to grant summary judgment
for the defendants without evaluating the substance of the allega-
tions.60  The harbormaster reported her supervisor for his incessant
homophobic comments and repeatedly requested to be transferred
out of his department.61  Her requests to transfer were ignored, and
two months after her report she was given disciplinary notice and put
on administrative leave for allegedly awarding a contract to a relative
of her significant other.62  But her disciplinary hearing did not focus
on the matter of the questionable contract bid, and instead centered
on her sexual orientation and inquiries about her significant other.63
Even in the face of a Sixth Circuit case that did not apply the Title VII
framework to evaluate a § 1983 claim of discrimination related to sex-
ual orientation,64 the Ambris court applied the Romer holding to
equal protection claims in the government employment context.65
The Ambris court claimed that the Sixth Circuit had not provided
sufficient guidance on whether equal protection claims involving sex-
ual orientation should be analyzed under Title VII.66  The court’s em-
phasis on the Title VII framework, which does not apply to sexual
minorities, implicitly subverted the § 1983 claim regarding equal pro-
tection.67  Moreover, the court minimized the existing Sixth Circuit
precedent that could have been applied, reasoning that one circuit
court ruling was insufficient and that there was “heavily conflicting
case law” within the circuit.68  The court did not cite to any cases that
held differently than the one supporting availability of equal protec-
tion for sexual minorities.69
60. See Ambris v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:12CV774, 2012 WL 5874367, at *2, *8–10 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 19, 2012).
61. Id. at *2–3.
62. Id. at *3.
63. Id.
64. See Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir. 2006) (“‘The
desire to effectuate one’s animus against homosexuals . . . can never be a legitimate governmen-
tal purpose, [and] a state action based on that animus alone violates the Equal Protection
Clause.’ . . .  [Plaintiff] has offered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether [defendants] were motivated by animus against homosexuals.” (second alteration in
original) (quoting Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873–74 (6th Cir. 1997))).
65. See Ambris, 2012 WL 5874367, at *5–9 (discussing Scarbrough, 470 F.3d 250).
66. See id. at *8–10.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at *8 (“[T]he heavily conflicting case law in the Sixth Circuit would tend to show
that there is no ‘clearly established right.’  The Courts have been all over the place with regard to
treating such claims for disparate treatment based on sexual orientation, so it would be difficult
to say that Defendant . . . knew, or should have known, that he was violating a clearly established
right.”).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Qualified Immunity Fails as a Tool to Clarify Rights
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner critiqued the qualified immu-
nity doctrine over twenty years ago, remarking that “[t]he easiest
cases don’t even arise.”70  Judge Posner’s point was that if a new claim
had squarely fit the exact precedent in which the law or right had been
clearly established, the doctrine could not provide meaningful protec-
tion from government officials who violate an individual’s rights.71
But the Gill, Lathrop, and Ambris plaintiffs seemingly presented
the easiest cases—there was clear animus in each allegation of dis-
crimination, and clear precedent from Romer that “‘a bare . . . desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.’”72  Yet one plaintiff got her day in court,73 a
second received the opportunity to press the case that discrimination
against him was indeed unconstitutional,74 and the third did not even
get an opportunity to have the substance of her issues heard.75  These
cases illuminate problems with the qualified immunity doctrine that
are gaining significance: the analysis results in a defendant-friendly
environment in which it is harder to identify clearly established rights,
and courts do not serve society by clarifying and defining rights so that
future actors are put on notice.
Despite the stated purpose of the first prong of the qualified immu-
nity doctrine to put government actors on notice going forward, in
practice, a ruling that there is a violation of a constitutional right with-
out a ruling that the right was clearly established does not create ef-
fective notice.76  Pamela Karlan has associated the qualified immunity
70. K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990) (critiquing the immunity
doctrine in determining that state foster care officials were not immune from liability in the harm
caused to a child placed in dangerous foster care situations).
71. See id. (“It begins to seem as if to survive a motion to dismiss a suit on grounds of immu-
nity the plaintiff must be able to point to a previous case that differs only trivially from his case.
But this cannot be right.”).
72. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
73. Gill v. Devlin, 867 F. Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
74. Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, Civil No. 10-2361 (DWF/LIB), 2012 WL 185780 (D. Minn.
Jan. 23, 2012).
75. Ambris v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:12CV774, 2012 WL 5874367 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19,
2012).
76. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1913, 1924 (2007) (“While the Supreme Court has not decided if determining whether
the law was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the underlying events ‘should be evaluated by
reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District
Court[s],’ several courts of appeals have held that district court decisions cannot ‘clearly estab-
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doctrine with part of the Court’s trend to “undermine[] the concept of
the ‘private attorney general’ who brings suit to vindicate both her
own claims and the broader public interest.”77  A court can issue de-
claratory and injunctive relief altering the practice of defendants who
otherwise have qualified immunity from damage claims.78  However,
without attorney’s fees or even minimal damages, a plaintiff may be
reluctant to appeal a prong-one decision.79  Moreover, a defendant
may appeal the prong-one holding, but only by taking on the risk that
an affirmation would create circuit-wide precedent, rather than a
more limited district court holding.80  When the Court in 2009 over-
turned the short-lived practice of requiring a prong-one analysis
before prong two, it spared the district courts from tackling unneces-
sary constitutional questions when a reasonable person would not
have known the right was clearly established (prong two).81  Now that
courts can rely primarily on prong two, as the Ambris court did,82 and
find that even if there were a right, it was not clearly established, an
appeal is even less likely.  And with fewer appeals, it is less likely that
a right can be identified and established by court precedent.
The Supreme Court has acted recently to remove the “clearly estab-
lished” label from a right if there is disagreement among the circuits.83
In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on both
prongs of its qualified immunity analysis, holding that it was not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment to seize an individual under a ma-
terial witness warrant when the government official has no intent to
use him as a witness, and that no jurisdiction had ruled in such a way
to clearly establish that such an action would be unconstitutional.84  A
year later in Reichle v. Howards, the Court reversed the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s denial of qualified immunity to Secret Service agents who vio-
lish’ constitutional law for purposes of § 1983 liability.” (alteration in original) (quoting Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982))).
77. Id. at 1927.
78. Id. at 1925–26.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“The judges of the district courts and
the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circum-
stances in the particular case at hand.”).
82. Ambris v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:12CV774, 2012 WL 5874367, at *22–23 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 19, 2012) (“The Courts have been all over the place with regard to treating such claims for
disparate treatment based on sexual orientation, so it would be difficult to say that Defendant
Bahhur knew, or should have known, that he was violating a clearly established right.”).
83. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); see also Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct.
2088 (2012).
84. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080, 2083–84.
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lated the First Amendment by arresting a suspect in retaliation for
comments they heard him make against the Vice President under their
protection.85  The Court averred that qualified immunity will not be
granted when the legal issue is defined at a “high level of general-
ity.”86  Additionally, the Court held that when the impact of a new
Supreme Court ruling has not yet been determined with regard to cir-
cuit-level precedent on a related question, the entire area is consid-
ered sufficiently in flux that a reasonable official should not be denied
qualified immunity.87
Scholars and commentators have reacted to these two decisions
with concern that the Court is developing a new doctrine for how
courts may find “clearly established law.”  One commentator noted
that the Reichle decision may have severely narrowed “clearly estab-
lished law,” particularly for circuit-level precedent, because it pre-
cluded finding the law clearly established in that circuit when “it was
at least arguable” that the Supreme Court ruling affected the circuit
precedent on a separate, but related issue.88  And Orin Kerr added his
concern on the Reichle ruling that circuit precedent, without consen-
sus among other circuits, may no longer be sufficient to clearly estab-
lish the law in that home circuit.89  While a third commentator viewed
this decision as a narrow ruling, he nonetheless noted that the Court
did not rule on the substance of the alleged violation, but only that the
average federal agent would not have found clear guidance on the law
due to the differences among circuits.90
The Reichle decision drew heavily on the Pearson v. Callahan and
al-Kidd precedents to justify its focus only on the second, “clearly es-
tablished” prong of qualified immunity analysis.91  This line of cases
may imply a significant change emerging to restrict the ability of lower
courts to identify “clearly established” constitutional rights and
85. Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2089–90, 2093.
86. Id. at 2094 n.5 (rejecting an analogy related to a Fourteenth Amendment violation and its
applicability to the case at bar’s First Amendment issue because “we do not define clearly estab-
lished law at such a ‘high level of generality’” (quoting al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084)).
87. See id. at 2095.
88. See Kent Scheidegger, Circuit Precedent and “Clearly Established” Law, CRIME & CONSE-
QUENCES BLOG (June 4, 2012, 9:27 AM), http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2012/
06/circuit-precedent-and-clearly-.html (quoting Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2096).
89. See Orin Kerr, Circuit Precedent and “Clearly Established” Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(June 6, 2012, 12:33 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/06/circuit-precedent-and-clearly-es-
tablished-law/.
90. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Recap: Narrow Ruling on Arrests, SCOTUSBLOG (June 4, 2012,
12:55 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/opinion-recap-narrow-ruling-on-arrests/.
91. See Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093.
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thereby deny qualified immunity.92  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
al-Kidd suggested a new paradigm for analyzing qualified immunity
that would create a different standard for finding “clearly established
law” when the defendants were federal officials.93  The Reichle Court,
rather than finding immunity only for a federal agent acting in a land-
scape of circuit disagreement, held, perhaps more broadly, that when
it is arguable but not clear that a Supreme Court ruling may affect
existing circuit precedent, the government official receives qualified
immunity.94
The Supreme Court has, in the past few years, ruled in ways that
may deter courts from prospectively establishing law through a prong-
one analysis and that curtail the ability of lower courts to find “clearly
established law” in their own precedents that run counter to the deci-
sions of sister circuits.  An implicit insistence seems to have emerged
from these decisions that, absent a Supreme Court ruling or federal
statute, only a true “consensus of persuasive authority” can define
“clearly established law” for the denial of qualified immunity.  Ulti-
mately, the current state of the qualified immunity doctrine limits the
ability of an individual to bring, as a “private attorney general,” a
claim that would clarify the contours of clearly established rights a
government official may not violate.
B. The Clearly Established Constitutional Rights Regarding
Sexual Orientation
Several key challenges arise in evaluating the constitutional guaran-
tees associated with sexual orientation.  Courts have traditionally
been reluctant to address sexual orientation as a status akin to race,
religion, or gender.  Instead courts sometimes framed constitutional
92. See Lyle Denniston, A New “Kennedy Doctrine,” SCOTUSBLOG (June 4, 2011, 2:14 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/a-new-kennedy-doctrine/.
93. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085–87 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A
national officeholder intent on retaining qualified immunity need not abide by the most stringent
standard adopted anywhere in the United States.  And [she] need not guess at when a relatively
small set of appellate precedents have established a binding legal rule. . . .  [Otherwise] those
officers would be deterred from full use of their legal authority.”).
94. See Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2097.  Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, joined by Justice Breyer,
would have granted the immunity to the secret service agents in this case, not on the rationale
imported from the Kennedy concurrence in al-Kidd and suggested by the petitioner, but because
these agents have a special responsibility to defend against assassinations and must incorporate
information such as statements heard into their immediate decision making. Id. at 2097–98
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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issues raised by sexual minorities in terms of homosexual acts and
conduct.95  As Pamela Karlan explained:
The situation of gay people provokes an “analogical crisis” because
in some ways it involves regulation of particular acts in which gay
people engage, and so seems most amenable to analysis under the
liberty prong of the Due Process Clause, while in other ways it in-
volves regulation of a group of people who are defined not so much
by what they do in the privacy of their bedrooms, but by who they
are in the public sphere.96
Furthermore, it is challenging to evaluate what rights exist in the rap-
idly changing landscape of legislation relating to sexual minorities,
state and federal court decisions on specific issues like marriage and
adoption, and social discourse on gay rights.
Equal protection—the right associated with the Gill, Lathrop, and
Ambris decisions—traditionally focuses on an individual and her im-
mutable characteristics, such as race, gender, or national origin, al-
though it has also been used to address the rights of individuals
sharing traits detested by the majority.97  One’s conduct, by contrast,
is more often associated with Due Process Clause protections of a lib-
erty right, such as privacy, education, or child rearing.98  Despite such
distinctions, these rights and the analysis of them are often inter-
twined.  “Gay rights cases ‘just can’t be steered readily onto the strict
scrutiny or the rationality track,’ let alone onto the due process/con-
duct or the equal protection/status track.”99
95. See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 544–45 (1992).
The United States v. Windsor decision is notable in part because it identified same-sex married
couples as a class, and found that treating these couples differently than all other married
couples violated the Equal Protection Clause.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96
(2013). Windsor did not address gay individuals, however.
96. Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1457 (2004) (footnote
omitted).
97. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“For if the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”).
98. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding protected liberty interests
in the marriage relationship and the bedroom); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35
(1925) (recognizing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control.  As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that
the rights of parents to determine the education of their children is a liberty protected under the
Due Process Clause).
99. Karlan, supra note 96, at 1450 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-
Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297
(1993)).
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In her analysis of Lawrence v. Texas shortly after it came down,
Karlan closely associated the case with the Loving v. Virginia decision
that struck down bans on interracial marriages,100 explaining that both
cases involved the interplay between the jurisprudence of liberty and
the jurisprudence of equality.101  Karlan argued that Lawrence crystal-
lized a doctrine that had been evolving since Griswold v. Connecticut
and Loving—that “‘the substantive reach of liberty’ under the Due
Process Clause extends to the way individuals choose to conduct their
intimate relationships.”102  Indeed, the Court in United States v. Wind-
sor confirmed and expanded this reading when it interpreted the Law-
rence holding as the constitutional protection of an individual’s “moral
and sexual choices.”103
Both Romer and Lawrence, according to Karlan, “undermine[] the
traditional tiers of scrutiny altogether,” with Romer eschewing the
levels-of-scrutiny analysis for equal protection claims and Lawrence
avoiding the traditional strict scrutiny threshold for due process
claims.104  While these landmark cases addressing constitutional rights
for sexual minorities may not adhere to the traditional methodology
for judicial analysis, it does not follow that these decisions have not
clearly established the law.  Conscientious and discerning courts have
applied the Romer and Lawrence holdings to confirm and vindicate
the rights of sexual minorities violated by government actors,105 and
yet many courts have failed sexual minorities by ignoring or misinter-
preting these precedents.106
1. The Clearly Established Law from Romer v. Evans
Despite its initial discussion of classifications, the Romer Court did
not apply a typical classification assignment to sexual minorities and
instead first found that the challenged amendment itself was not ra-
tional; that is to say, it bore no reasonable relationship to any legiti-
mate government purpose.107  The Romer Court’s discussion of
rational-basis review drew from some of the most deferential rational-
100. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
101. Karlan, supra note 96, at 1449.
102. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003)).
103. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).  Because the Windsor decision
addressed the status and rights of same-sex couples, most of its reasoning does not relate to this
Comment.
104. Karlan, supra note 96, at 1450.
105. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004).
106. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004).
107. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see also Leonard, supra note 40, at 534–35.
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basis cases in the Court’s history.108  Yet, the Romer Court distin-
guished the challenged government action in each of these prior cases
from the Colorado constitutional amendment at issue because, in
each, the burden to the classification bore “a rational relationship to
an independent and legitimate legislative end” and was “not drawn
for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”109
The Romer majority also discussed a second line of rational-basis
reasoning, often referred to as “rational basis with bite,”110 that ap-
plies a slightly more probing analysis to ensure “that a bare . . . desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”111  Courts since Romer have wrestled with the
issue of whether sexual orientation triggers a heightened scrutiny for
equal protection analysis, but such efforts have either failed or found
no traction with the Supreme Court.  The Second Circuit’s holding in
Windsor, for instance, held that homosexuality was a classification like
gender that required a heightened level of scrutiny;112 however, the
Supreme Court ignored this point in its Windsor decision.113
Without linking the facts to either a rational-basis, or a rational-
basis-with-bite analysis, and without addressing whether sexual orien-
tation is the type of classification that requires a heightened level of
scrutiny, the Romer Court held that “[a] State cannot so deem a class
of persons a stranger to its laws,” and thereby declared the amend-
ment unconstitutional.114
Two key post-Romer cases in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
demonstrate that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
108. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); William-
son v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949); Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947)).
109. See id. at 632–33.
110. The term “rational basis with bite” gained recognition in the mid-1980s in the wake of
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); the term is attributed to Victor
Rosenblum. See David O. Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985,
at 108, 112–14 (noting Rosenblum’s description of the Court’s analysis as “rational basis with
teeth”); see also Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Back Its Bite: The Role of Rational Basis
Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 280 n.8 (2013).
111. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
112. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–82 (2d Cir.) (“In this case, all four factors
justify heightened scrutiny: A) homosexuals as a group have historically endured persecution
and discrimination; B) homosexuality has no relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to soci-
ety; C) homosexuals are a discernible group with non-obvious distinguishing characteristics, es-
pecially in the subset of those who enter same-sex marriages; and D) the class remains a
politically weakened minority.”), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2012).
113. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683–84 (acknowledging the grounds for the Second Circuit
ruling, but then ignoring it in the majority decision).
114. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
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would henceforth constitute a violation of equal protection under the
law, and clearly established that a government official would not re-
ceive qualified immunity against such an allegation.115  Both circuits
denied qualified immunity to school officials whose actions and fail-
ures to act resulted in violations of the equal protection rights of gay
and lesbian students.
In Nabozny v. Podlesny, the Seventh Circuit evaluated a § 1983
claim that school officials had violated a student’s rights to equal pro-
tection under the law when they acted with deliberate indifference to
the years of persistent verbal and physical abuse that the student suf-
fered at the hands of his classmates.116  The court explained its stan-
dards in evaluating an equal protection discrimination claim:
The gravamen of equal protection lies not in the fact of deprivation
of a right but in the invidious classification of persons aggrieved by
the state’s action. . . .  [Discriminatory purpose] implies that a deci-
sionmaker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment
and selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of
causing its adverse effects on the identifiable group.117
Nabozny involved equal protection claims on the basis of both sexual
orientation and gender.  The student alleged that the school adminis-
trators acted with indifference because he was gay, and that this action
was substantially different from the way they would have responded
to a female student reporting similar types of abuse.118  The court
found gender-based discrimination by virtue of the school’s different
treatment of the male student and its departure from customary pol-
icy: the school “aggressively punished male-on-female battery and
harassment,” but not the abuse Nabozny suffered, which included a
mock rape by classmates.119  The court believed that “a reasonable
state actor would have known that his actions, viewed in the light of
the law at the time, were unlawful.”120  The court acknowledged the
recently published Romer decision, but because Romer was decided
115. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996); Flores v. Moran Hill Unified
Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
116. Nabozny, 92 F.3d 446, 449.
117. Id. at 453–54 (quoting Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982)).
118. See id. at 454.
119. Id. at 454–55.
120. Id. at 456.  The question of whether equal protection rights could be asserted on the basis
of sexual orientation discrimination was more challenging for the court without the availability
of the Romer holding than the gender discrimination basis, but the court noted that the record
provided sufficient evidence “that the discriminatory treatment was motivated by the defend-
ants’ disapproval of Nabozny’s sexual orientation.” Id. at 457.  The court expressly reasoned
that sexual orientation does situate individuals in an identifiable minority status subject to dis-
crimination. Id.
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after the Nabozny facts occurred, it could not be applied to a qualified
immunity analysis.121
In Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, the Ninth Circuit
addressed the question of equal protection rights and qualified immu-
nity for school officials alleged to have acted with deliberate indiffer-
ence to peer-on-peer harassment and bullying based on the victims’
sexual orientation.122  The court upheld the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity for the school official defendants because the
plaintiffs “show[ed] that the defendants, acting under color of state
law, discriminated against them as members of an identifiable class
and that the discrimination was intentional.”123  The court noted that
the Second Circuit, in addition to the Seventh Circuit in Nabozny,124
had found deliberate indifference and improper motive in school offi-
cials who “respond[ed] to known peer harassment in a manner that is
. . . clearly unreasonable.”125  In denying qualified immunity to the
defendants, the court framed the issue broadly:
The guarantee of equal protection . . . requires the defendants to
enforce District policies in cases of peer harassment of homosexual
and bisexual students in the same way that they enforce those poli-
cies in cases of peer harassment of heterosexual students. . . .  The
constitutional violation lies in the discriminatory enforcement of the
policies, not in the violation of the school policies themselves.126
The Nabozny and Flores cases clearly demonstrate that post-Romer
courts can find equal protection violations in the disparate treatment
by government actors of homosexuals compared to similarly situated
heterosexuals.
2. The Clearly Established Law from Lawrence v. Texas
Lawrence, as Romer before it, departed from the standard approach
of determining whether the liberty at stake was fundamental and
thereby deserving of a strict scrutiny analysis, and made a “magisterial
but vague” description of the liberty interest without addressing
121. Id. at 457 n.12.  The court found “that reasonable persons in the defendants’ positions in
1988 would have concluded that discrimination against Nabozny based on his sexual orientation
was unconstitutional” because of a policy protecting students from sexual orientation discrimina-
tion that was in place at the time of the alleged discrimination. Id. at 457–58.
122. Flores v. Moran Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
123. Id. at 1134–35.
124. Id. at 1135 (citing Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1999);
Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 454).
125. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 649 (1999)).
126. Id. at 1137–38.
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whether to apply strict scrutiny.127  The Court opted not to address the
equal protection challenge to the statute, even though it had granted
certiorari on both the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause issues.128  Nonetheless, as both Pamela Karlan and Laurence
Tribe have argued, equal protection is deeply embedded in the Law-
rence decision.129 Lawrence derived its reasoning130 from the privacy
rights found in Griswold v. Connecticut,131 Eisenstadt v. Baird,132 Roe
v. Wade,133 and the post-Bowers decision Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.134  But the opinion ranged be-
yond these cases’ conceptions of liberty as “the absence of interfer-
ence” by the state;135 instead, the Court “described the liberty at issue
as gay people’s right to ‘control their destiny,’ because ‘[a]t the heart
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”136  How-
ever, because the same decision concludes that “[t]he Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal life of the individual,”137 it can be inferred that there
might be other situations in which a state could provide a legitimate
interest that would justify such an intrusion.  Indeed, Lawrence in-
cludes a long list of exceptions limiting the protection for individual
sexual and moral choices.138
127. Karlan, supra note 96, at 1450.
128. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 574–75 (2003).
129. See Karlan, supra note 96, at 1450–51; Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fun-
damental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1934 (2004). See gener-
ally infra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.
130. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–65, 573–74.
131. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding protected liberty interests in the
marriage relationship and the bedroom).
132. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the liberty interests of the bedroom
to unmarried persons and their right to decide for themselves whether to get pregnant).
133. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman has a liberty right, albeit not an
absolute one, to make decisions affecting her life and whether to abort a pregnancy).
134. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the substantial
liberty rights inherent in personal decisions related to family relationships, procreation, and con-
traception), quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“These matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life.”).
135. Karlan, supra note 96, at 1452 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 123 (1969)).
136. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, 578).
137. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
138. Id. (excluding from its holding sexual choices involving minors, individuals injured or
coerced, public sexual conduct and prostitution, and government recognition of same-sex
marriages).
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Both Karlan and Tribe interpret the Lawrence decision as a signifi-
cant “doctrinal innovation” linking the “due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty”
with “[e]quality of treatment.”139  The Court in Lawrence identified
the interrelatedness of the moral stigma attached to homosexual con-
duct and the ways in which laws against gay sex contributed to the
social ostracization of homosexuals and burdened their rights to
“equal liberty” through privacy inside the bedroom and dignity in so-
ciety at large.140
Despite the powerful statement for both due process and equality
rights in Lawrence, most courts have not confirmed it as clearly estab-
lished law.141  In one of the few lower court decisions to embrace
Lawrence for its full meaning, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a Texas law
grounded in morality justifications.142  Holding that Texas’s ban on sex
toys “impermissibly burden[ed] the individual’s substantive due pro-
cess right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choos-
ing,”143 the court explained that “to uphold the statute would be to
ignore the holding in Lawrence and allow the government to burden
consensual private intimate conduct simply by deeming it morally of-
fensive.”144  The Fifth Circuit, then, has unequivocally accepted the
holding of Lawrence—that one’s intrinsic human dignity encompasses
moral and sexual choices, and that these choices are constitutionally
protected.
3. Avoiding the Clearly Established Law of Romer and Lawrence
Rights related to sexual orientation provide a useful context for
evaluating the doctrine of qualified immunity because of the unusual
reasoning employed in Romer and Lawrence.  By eschewing the stan-
dard forms of scrutiny applied in equal protection and due process
considerations, these two cases, particularly Lawrence, have presented
challenges to courts attempting to apply their holdings.145
139. Tribe, supra note 129, at 1934 (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575);
see also Karlan, supra note 96, 1449–50 (“Lawrence is a case about liberty that has important
implications for the jurisprudence of equality.”).
140. Tribe, supra note 129, at 1896, 1898; see also Karlan, supra note 96, at 1458.
141. See generally LiJia Gong & Rachel Shapiro, Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. Texas, 13
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 487 (2012).
142. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Gong & Sha-
piro, supra note 141, at 510.
143. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 738, 744.
144. Id. at 745.
145. See Gong & Shapiro, supra note 141, at 495 (surveying cases citing Lawrence and demon-
strating that most courts have either found that Lawrence did not establish a new fundamental
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A key challenge for courts attempting to apply the Romer and Law-
rence holdings has been the influence of Justice Scalia’s dissents in
these cases.  By invoking the culture wars in his Romer dissent and by
ignoring the significant innovation in Lawrence of equating the harm
to human dignity that occurs from societal homophobia with the
criminalization of private, intimate relationships,146 Justice Scalia pro-
vided strong rhetoric to undermine the majority holdings.  Unscrupu-
lous courts could dismiss Romer as merely a single round in an
undecided political dispute over traditional mores,147 and narrow
Lawrence by claiming that it never explicitly characterized sodomy or
anything else related to homosexual conduct as a fundamental
right.148  Moreover, Justice Scalia’s dissents explicitly tie sexual con-
duct to the status of being a homosexual, committing the precise harm
the Lawrence majority identified that came from stigmatizing individ-
uals publically for their protected private relationships.
Arthur Leonard points out that the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have applied Justice Scalia’s dissents.149  Additionally, the Sixth
Circuit demonstrated the influence of Justice Scalia’s dissent in a key
ruling on facts similar to Romer.150  In a challenge to a law similar to
the Colorado constitutional amendment struck down in Romer ban-
ning “special protections” for sexual minorities enacted in Cincinnati,
the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
right necessitating heightened review or that the facts before them were outside the parameters
of protection defined by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence).
146. See supra note 40.
147. See, e.g., Ambris v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:12CV774, 2012 WL 5874367, at *9 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 19, 2012) (reasoning that “Romer was decided outside of an employment context,”
rather than acknowledging that Romer’s application was extremely broad and did include gov-
ernment employment within its context).
148. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815 (11th
Cir. 2004) (narrowly reading Lawrence as a banning of sodomy laws in part because it did not
identify the fundamental substantive due process right that would require heightened scrutiny).
149. Leonard, supra note 40, at 523 n.19 (citing Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857 (8th Cir.
2006) (citing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence to infer that because the majority decision said
there was no legitimate state interest, it was employing a rational-basis, not strict scrutiny stan-
dard, and therefore had not held that “homosexual sodomy” is a fundamental right); Cook v.
Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 394–95 (D. Mass. 2006) (refusing to apply Lawrence as holding
that there was a fundamental liberty interest in consensual adult relationships, because Justice
Scalia’s dissent refuted that interpretation, “and it might be expected that if [Justice Scalia’s]
statement wrongly characterized a principal holding of the case, the majority would have an-
swered and corrected it.  Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, it more plausibly appears that the
majority’s silence on that point amounted to acquiescence in the dissent’s statement that the case
did not hold what the plaintiffs here say it did.”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Cook v. Gates,
528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008)); see also Lofton, 358 F.3d 804 (upholding Florida’s ban on allowing
gays to adopt children).
150. See generally Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th
Cir. 1997).
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the contemporaneous Romer decision.151  However—in what Leonard
characterized as a “willful misrepresentation of the Romer Court’s
handling of the Equal Protection analysis”152—the Sixth Circuit nar-
rowed the Romer holding to being an objection to a generally applica-
ble state law that interfered with local citizens’ ability to create laws
applicable only locally,153 and upheld the ordinance because it was of
a local rather than statewide scope.154
When courts employ Justice Scalia’s dissents to limit the Romer and
Lawrence holdings, they are set on an analytical path that further un-
dermines the majority holdings.  Significantly, when Justice Scalia
framed Lawrence as a ban on laws prohibiting sodomy,155 he asserted
a very specific and narrow holding that would allow lower courts to
avoid a broader generalization of the holding—that it is unconstitu-
tional for the state to regulate laws governing private sexual choices
because such laws harm human dignity.156  In Lofton v. Secretary of
the Department of Children & Family Services, for instance, when the
Eleventh Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of Florida’s ban on
allowing gays to adopt, it narrowly viewed Lawrence as prohibiting
sodomy laws and not as an assertion of the fundamental right to pri-
vate, intimate relationships.157  By doing so, the court could then ac-
cept the Florida government’s rationale for not allowing sexual
minorities to adopt children without triggering the protection of a fun-
damental right and the heightened scrutiny it would require.158  Fur-
thermore, by adopting Justice Scalia’s narrow views, Romer became
irrelevant to the court’s reasoning; Romer could have been used to
151. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
152. Leonard, supra note 40, at 540.
153. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 128 F.3d at 295–99.
154. Id. at 296 (“[T]he language of the Cincinnati Charter Amendment, read in its full con-
text, merely prevented homosexuals, as homosexuals, from obtaining special privileges and pref-
erences . . . from the City.  In stark contrast, Colorado Amendment 2’s far broader language
could be construed to exclude homosexuals from the protection of every Colorado state
law . . . .”).
155. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition
of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).  Tribe and Dorf developed this concept in answer to
Justice Scalia’s formulation in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), regarding the identi-
fication of fundamental rights.  Tribe & Dorf, supra, at 1058.  Tribe and Dorf argued that values
are embedded in any analysis of fundamental rights, but that the crucial process of determining
fundamental rights need not be merely a reflection of a judge’s personal values: “a typical judi-
cial opinion distinguishes between essential and non-essential facts, and that by paying attention
to such distinctions, judges trained in the method of the common law can generalize from prior
cases without merely imposing their own values.” Id. at 1059 (emphasis omitted).
157. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815 (11th Cir.
2004).
158. See id. at 818–20.
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attack Florida’s discrimination against gay people wishing to adopt as
irrational animus against sexual minorities disguised as the need to
protect and promote heterosexual norms.159
Though courts have less regularly applied Lawrence than Romer,
when they have done so it has been the “zone of dignity” language
that indicates what kind of moral and sexual choices are not protected
under Lawrence.160 Lawrence excluded from its protection sexual
choices involving minors, individuals who were coerced or injured in
relationships, public conduct, and prostitution.161  Courts have effec-
tively applied this “zone of dignity” aspect of Lawrence to interpret
the holding as an as-applied decision to distinguish it from cases in-
volving inequities in criminal codes between same-sex and different-
sex minors, prostitution and “unnatural oral carnal copulation,” and
even a North Carolina law banning sodomy outright—which Law-
rence at least should have been seen to have facially invalidated.162
Regardless of the motivation, the implication for the qualified im-
munity doctrine is that lower courts have not always found clearly es-
tablished law, even when it should be by virtue of clear Supreme
Court precedent.
C. Three Courts Tackle Similar Facts and Reach Different Results,
Illustrating the Problem
Returning to the three cases of government employment discrimi-
nation introduced at the beginning of this Comment, the challenges
presented by finding clearly established law become clear.  Even with
159. The Lofton decision does not attack the circular reasoning of the state’s asserted goal—
preserving “traditional family values,” see id.—because the entire decision is predicated on the
position that the state’s interest in promoting heterosexuality and inhibiting homosexuality is a
legitimate one.  Yet, there is no basis for the court’s acceptance of such a goal as legitimate.
Indeed, the Second Circuit’s holding in Windsor that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect status
was in part to avoid placing the burden on the plaintiffs to prove a lack of legitimate purpose
against arguments like “protection of traditional marriage . . . and the encouragement of ‘respon-
sible’ procreation.” See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir.), aff’d on other
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2012).  In analyzing the Windsor decision, one commentator explored
the competing conceptions of marriage raised by Justice Alito in his dissent—the “conjugal” and
“consent-based” understandings. See Gerard Bradley, Great Expectations, SCOTUSBLOG (June
26, 2013, 6:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/great-expectations/.  The “conjugal” un-
derstanding of marriage is about the union itself and the procreative purpose thought by defend-
ers of marriage to be the intrinsic core of marriage. Id.  By contrast, the “consent”
understanding demonstrated by the majority in Windsor is about the persons who enter into
marriage and the dignity conferred on them by the state’s recognition of their choice to marry.
Id.
160. See Gong & Shapiro, supra note 141, at 492.
161. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
162. Gong & Shapiro, supra note 141, at 501–03 (quoting State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233,
1234 (La. 2005)).
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Supreme Court decisions addressing the issues presented broadly, dis-
trict courts can be constrained by circuit court holdings in ways that
undermine the power of Romer and Lawrence.
Ambris v. City of Cleveland demonstrates the misapplication of law
and precedent when the court avoided addressing the plaintiff’s claims
that her government employers treated her differently than similarly
situated heterosexual employees.163  The court reasoned that it was
bound by circuit precedent to treat the Title VII and the § 1983 claims
under the same Title VII analysis.164  However, the cases cited to sup-
port the required Title VII analysis addressed situations in which Title
VII addressed the alleged harms;165 whereas, sexual orientation dis-
crimination is not protected under Title VII.  Ambris’s invocation of
§ 1983 was necessary because her equal protection claim could be ad-
dressed under that broader statute.166  The court rigidly applied the
precedents requiring a Title VII analysis for identical § 1983 claims
even while acknowledging that the Sixth Circuit had affirmed that “a
state action based on . . . animus [against homosexuals] alone violates
the Equal Protection Clause.”167  The court went to great lengths to
address and distinguish that case in which government employment
discrimination related to sexual orientation was analyzed solely under
§ 1983 as an equal protection claim, and found that decision lacking
an express abrogation of the Title VII analytical requirement.168
Furthermore, to address why qualified immunity was proper even if
there had been a constitutional violation, the court narrowly con-
strued Romer to distinguish it from the case at bar: “Romer is distin-
guishable from the facts in the present case. Romer was decided
outside of an employment context. There is no mention of Title VII
throughout the entire opinion . . . .”169 Such a narrow reading of
Romer is highly disingenuous, given that Romer struck down a Colo-
rado constitutional amendment in part because of the broad range of
163. See Ambris v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:12CV774, 2012 WL 5874367, at *9–10 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 19, 2012).
164. Id. at *5–6.
165. Id.
166. See id. at *4 (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
transgendered firefighter had adequately alleged both Title VII and § 1983 equal protection
claims on a theory of gender stereotyping and related retaliation); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d
1317 (6th Cir. 1988) (addressing gender discrimination by university officials against a female
professor under both Title VII and § 1983); Lautermilch v. Findlay City Sch, 314 F.3d 271 (6th
Cir. 2003) (teacher sued school district claiming gender-stereotype discrimination)).
167. Id. at *6 (quoting Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir.
2006)).
168. Id. at *5–6.
169. Id. at *9.
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impairments it imposed on homosexuals, specifically mentioning pro-
tections against employment discrimination.170  Moreover, the Ambris
court’s analysis provides a textbook example of how a narrowed read-
ing of a holding does injustice to the right being evaluated.171
Rather than proceeding as the Gill court did—accepting the plead-
ings as sufficiently showing a constitutional violation and then analyz-
ing whether it was clearly established law172—the Lathrop court found
“sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the Defendant Officers violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.”173  The Lathrop court stopped short of finding a constitutional
violation, despite employing a Romer-type analysis; however, the
judge was by no means looking to diminish the allegations of discrimi-
nation.174  But it is possible that without a controlling case in the
Eighth Circuit like the Fifth Circuit’s Johnson precedent—upon which
Gill relied in large part to find clearly a clearly established constitu-
tional right175—this district court did not feel free to judge the allega-
tions as consistent with a constitutional violation, let alone a clearly
established one.  Indeed, Eighth Circuit precedent may have ham-
pered the Lathrop judge, as that circuit court had previously relied
strongly on Justice Scalia’s dissents in Romer and Lawrence.176  At the
same time, the Lathrop court also demonstrated its concern for the
vindication of the plaintiff’s rights by circumventing the potentially
fatal flaw that the plaintiff provided no comparators in an employ-
ment discrimination allegation.177  The portion of the decision analyz-
ing the discriminatory workplace cited no precedent for the novel
170. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996) (“Amendment 2, in addition, nullifies specific
legal protections for this targeted class in all transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insur-
ance, health and welfare services, private education, and employment.”).
171. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing levels of generality).
172. See Gill v. Devlin, 867 F. Supp. 2d 849, 856–57 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
173. Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, Civil No. 10-2361 (DWF/LIB), 2012 WL 185780, at *7 (D.
Minn. Jan. 23, 2012).
174. See id. at *11 (“It seems to the Court . . . that an overnight metamorphosis [in Plaintiff’s
job performance] is unlikely, and the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that
Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff as a result of his sexual orientation.”).
175. See Gill, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004)).
176. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648–51 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (upholding Nebraska’s ban
against same-sex marriages); Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (holding that because the major-
ity decision in Lawrence said there was “no legitimate state interest,” it was employing a
rational-basis rather than strict scrutiny standard, and therefore had not held that “homosexual
sodomy” is a fundamental right).
177. Lathrop, 2012 WL 185780, at *7.
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argument that the comparator was the plaintiff himself prior to when
he came out at work.178
Gill represents the strongest plaintiff outcome of these three cases,
and it relied in its reasoning on Romer, Lawrence, and its circuit pre-
cedent, Johnson. It correctly applied the standard of consideration for
the defense’s dispositive motion: it accepted as true all well-pled and
nonconclusory allegations, and construed them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.179  It also accepted Romer and Lawrence as
controlling, both to find reasonable the plaintiff’s assertion that the
defendants had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right to equal
protection and to find that this right was clearly established law.180
The defendants settled the suit, rather than test the facts of the viola-
tion in court.181
The Gill court did not look for ways to diminish the strength of the
claim that there had been a violation of a clearly established right.
The straightforward application of controlling authority from both the
Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit leaves the impression that the
judge, a Republican appointee,182 was likely applying the law without
the influence of any personal beliefs or local societal norms on the
analysis.
In the Lathrop and Ambris cases, however, the judges struggled
with precedent to achieve a result that seems more related to personal
or societal norms than to the law.  The Lathrop judge, a Democrat
appointee,183 did not find that the facts as pleaded established a con-
stitutional violation.  Nonetheless, the Lathrop judge employed the
optional first prong of the qualified immunity analysis and accepted a
novel employment discrimination argument to avoid finding that the
plaintiff had failed to state a claim.184  Without circuit precedent, the
judge may not have been in the position to claim that sexual orienta-
tion discrimination in the context alleged was a constitutional viola-
tion, let alone a clearly established one.  However, he allowed the case
178. See id. at *6–7.
179. See Gill, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
180. Id. at 856–57.
181. Gill v. Devlin and Howell, supra note 4.
182. Terry R. Means was nominated by George H.W. Bush in 1991. Means, Terry R., History
of the Federal Judiciary: Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER [hereinaf-
ter Federal Judge Directory], http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1607&cid=999&ctype=
na&instate=na (last visited June 18, 2014).
183. Donovan W. Frank was nominated by William J. Clinton in 1998. Frank, Donovan W.,
Federal Judge Directory, supra note 182, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2793&cid=
999&ctype=na&instate=na.
184. See Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, Civil No. 10-2361 (DWF/LIB), 2012 WL 185780, at *6
(D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2012).
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to proceed so that such an assertion could be heard, as opposed to
using the lack of clarity in his circuit to grant qualified immunity on
the grounds that the right was not established.185  We can infer from
this case a considerable exercise of judicial discretion to at least pro-
mote the potential for a finding of a violation of a clearly established
right.
In Ambris a Republican appointee186 created an outcome more
favorable to the defendants than Sixth Circuit precedent would sup-
port.  The judge did not distinguish the analysis of the Title VII claim
from the § 1983 claim and ignored the circuit precedent allowing a
§ 1983 claim in the employment context to go forward despite sexual
orientation not being a suspect classification.187  The judge then nar-
rowly construed Romer to find it unrelated to employment cases in-
stead of giving it the breadth of impact seen in controlling circuit
precedent.
D. Rational-Basis Analysis Also Weakens Qualified
Immunity Doctrine
A recent alteration in the Court’s treatment of rational-basis review
may present even further challenges to courts evaluating a qualified
immunity defense in the context of constitutional protections for sex-
ual minorities.  Since the Romer Court affirmed that rational-basis
scrutiny requires a “rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose,”188 several decisions have emerged from the Roberts Court
that have given scholars pause over whether the “legitimate govern-
ment purpose” is still a steadfast requirement in rational review.189
This development underscores the problems yet to arise for plaintiffs
trying to avoid a grant of qualified immunity.
According to H. Jefferson Powell, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Scalia have articulated a new doctrine regarding the rational-basis
standard: that the review is only to enforce the Constitution’s provi-
sion against irrational laws, and nothing more.190  Rather than using
185. Id. at *7.
186. Christopher A. Boyko was nominated by George W. Bush in 2004. Boyko, Christopher
A., Federal Judge Directory, supra note 182, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3082&cid=
999&ctype=na&instate=na.
187. Ambris v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:12CV774, 2012 WL 5874367, at *5–9 (N.D. Ohio Nov.
19, 2012).
188. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
189. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and
the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217 (2011) (discussing District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); Engquist v.
Oregon Dep’t of Ag., 553 U.S. 591 (2008)).
190. See id. at 228–29, 276.
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rational-basis review as a tool to bridge the gap between explicit con-
stitutional language and societal norms, or to show deference to the
actions of the elected branches of government, the conservative jus-
tices are applying rational review only to prohibit law created “liter-
ally without reason.”191
The Romer decision could be particularly vulnerable to this new
line of jurisprudence on rational-basis review.  The Colorado amend-
ment was struck down for being nothing more than animus—a law
literally without reason.192  However, as the discussion above has
demonstrated, courts have alternatively considered Romer a rational-
basis or rational-basis-with-bite decision.193  Powell explains that the
Roberts Court conservatives would not feel burdened by this line of
rational-basis-with-bite cases, because the need for a normative judg-
ment that a government had a bad, or illegitimate, reason for a law is
irrelevant as long as the government has some reason—that is, any
rational basis—for the law.194  This thinking, Powell argues, is a radi-
cal departure from accepted constitutional law, to which even Justice
Scalia had previously subscribed in decisions holding that the need for
a rational basis “cannot be saved from constitutional challenge by a
defense that relates it to an illegitimate governmental interest.”195
The perception that the Roberts Court is moving away from consid-
ering whether a law is grounded in a legitimate government purpose
comes from the distinction between government actors working in a
rule-bound context and acting with legitimate discretion.196  Rather
than grounding rational-basis review in an assumption or even expec-
tation of good faith adherence to the Constitution by government ac-
tors, the Roberts Court is demonstrating that “there is no normative
element to rationality.”197  The key decision in which this line of
thinking debuted is Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture,
191. See id. at 255.
192. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (“It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests . . . .”).
193. See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text.
194. See Powell, supra note 189, at 254–55.
195. Id. at 255–56 (quoting Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988)).  The
Windsor decision also falls within the line of more muscular rational-basis cases, but it may be
the exception that proves Powell’s thesis: the majority decision invoked a new, “careful consider-
ation” level of review because of the suspicion of animus motivating the law. See United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).  Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Windsor may
prove essential against the emerging view of rationality described by Powell, because it identifies
a liberty interest that requires more careful review, even if there is no independent, equal protec-
tion justification for more than a rational treatment.
196. See Powell, supra note 189, at 263–64.
197. Id. at 275.
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wherein the Court held that the class-of-one equal protection right
does not apply to actions involving public employees.198  The Court
reasoned that when a government actor has clear standards for a deci-
sion, the application of equal protection under the law can be judged;
however, the courts cannot easily discern equal protection in discre-
tionary decisions that are “subjective and individualized” like a per-
sonnel action.199  In other words, “the Constitution puts no equal
protection constraint on the power of government to ‘treat[] an em-
ployee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at
all,’ at least if it does not make use of a group-based classification in
doing so.”200
The logic in the Engquist decision may extend beyond governmen-
tal personnel decisions because Justice Scalia referred to the Engquist
treatment of rational-basis review in District of Columbia v. Heller.201
Enquist could be applied to anything within the domain of an official’s
discretion: “His liability to judicial correction if he acts on the basis of
race or sex only confirms [that] there is an external rule, externally
enforced, that sets an outer bound to his domain of discretion.  Within
that domain, equal protection is silent.”202  According to Powell,
“[t]axpayers have no duty of good faith to maximize the government’s
goals, and political officials, after Engquist, apparently have no duty of
good faith to make discretionary decisions conform to the Constitu-
tion’s goals.”203
Here the impact on future treatment of the qualified immunity doc-
trine becomes clear and alarming to potential plaintiffs.  Where the
Constitution or a statute has not specifically enshrined an applicable
prohibition or external rule—that is, when no existing suspect classifi-
cation or enumerated right is implicated—the courts may in the future
only evaluate a law against whether it is rational or whether it is irra-
tional, with no consideration of whether the government purpose was
legitimate or illegitimate.204
198. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 609 (2008).
199. See id. at 602–03; see also Powell, supra note 189, at 263.
200. Powell, supra note 189, at 266 (alteration in original) (quoting Engquist, 553 U.S. at 606).
201. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (“But rational-basis scrutiny
is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are
themselves prohibitions on irrational laws.  In those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just the standard
of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional guarantee.” (citations omitted) (citing
Engquist, 553 U.S. 591)); see also Powell, supra note 189, at 272–73.
202. Powell, supra note 189 at 272.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 270–71.
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The key to how the qualified immunity doctrine will survive this
emerging approach to rational-basis review lies in the definition of
discretion.  In a case central to the establishment of the judge-made
qualified immunity doctrine, the Court explained that the doctrine
shields “government officials performing discretionary functions . . .
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not vio-
late clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”205
Romer’s susceptibility to being ignored may depend on whether it is
viewed as more closely allied with the highly deferential rational-basis
cases or with the rational-review-with-bite cases.  The first element in
the Romer Court’s reasoning illustrated the need to demonstrate that
a classification bore merely a relationship, however tenuous, to a gov-
ernmental goal.206  The Romer Court adamantly rejected laws drawing
classifications that disadvantaged a group and had no “independent
and legitimate legislative end.”207  A law drawn for no purpose other
than to disadvantage a specific group is, and should remain to be, seen
as precisely the kind of irrational law the Constitution prohibits, even
under the Roberts Court’s articulation of rational-basis review.  By
contrast, the Romer majority’s second line of reasoning, “that a bare
. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest,”208 would become irrelevant under
the Roberts Court’s approach to rational-basis review and undermine
its precedential value.
With Windsor, Justice Kennedy may have inoculated Lawrence and,
to some degree, Romer against a narrowed reading that could be ab-
rogated by this new approach to evaluating whether a government
purpose is legitimate.  By claiming in Windsor that the Lawrence hold-
ing found a constitutional protection for moral and sexual choices,209
Justice Kennnedy specifically asserted that a state does not have the
power to legislate on moral grounds to limit an individual’s sexual
choices.  This assertion may provide a broader basis for interpreting
Lawrence than the common formulation that moral disapproval is not
a legitimate reason for a government to burden certain private, con-
sensual conduct.210
205. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
206. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
207. Id. at 633.
208. Id. at 634 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 431 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
209. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
210. See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text (discussing the “zone of dignity” holding
of Lawrence).
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The Court’s emerging rational-basis doctrine may have an impor-
tant impact on qualified immunity analysis.  Imagine how much
harder it would have been for the Gill, Lathrop, and Ambris plaintiffs
to achieve a denial of qualified immunity if the courts were unable to
find clear guidance in Romer or Lawrence that an individual’s sexual
orientation fit neatly into the suspect classification mold.  Unless a
court embraced Romer and Lawrence for their nontraditional ap-
proach to equal protection and due process analysis, the lowered bar
of a rational-basis analysis would protect defendants and deny plain-
tiffs’ access to the courts.  Moreover, because § 1983 cases tend to in-
volve a government official’s actions, the Roberts Court’s deference
to an official’s discretion would likely result in a stronger opportunity
to receive immunity.
Despite the circuits’ differing interpretations of Romer and Law-
rence, there are two essential constitutional guarantees found in these
decisions: that an individual’s inherent dignity is protected against
government actions arising from nothing other than animus against a
classification such as one’s sexual orientation,211 and that this dignity
creates a zone of protection around the moral and sexual choices
made by two consenting adults.212  Yet, these decisions are central to a
still hotly contested question: in combining equal protection and due
process liberty interests, the privacy rights established nearly forty
years prior in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe have become entitle-
ments for everyone, but are gay people included in “everyone”?213
When government agents act in ways that burden the rights de-
scribed in Romer and Lawrence, this hot-button question of whether
gays are included in “everyone” heavily influences the outcome, even
though the two decisions explain the rights clearly.  Several factors
contribute to this problem.  First, the Romer and Lawrence methodol-
ogy eschews the traditional approach to equal protection and due pro-
cess analysis, and some courts have misrepresented these decisions.
Second, the Supreme Court has developed an approach to rational-
basis analysis that greatly broadens the appropriate discretion imbued
in decisionmakers.  Because of these first two conditions, the current
state and possible future trends of qualified immunity analysis ham-
pers courts’ abilities to find clearly established law.
211. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36.
212. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
213. See Karlan, supra note 96, at 1456.
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IV. IMPACT
In three cases of government officials denying their homosexual
employees their clearly established equal protection rights, three dif-
ferent courts in three different circuits arrived at different conclusions
regarding the availability of qualified immunity to the defendants.214
These three cases demonstrate that the qualified immunity doctrine
fails to serve its purpose of holding government officials accountable
for violations of clearly established rights, but otherwise protecting
them from unnecessary lawsuits that would distract them from their
ministerial responsibilities.  Courts could take two actions that would
better facilitate the qualified immunity doctrine’s purpose.  First,
courts should be more conscientious about evaluating issues against
the relevant precedent in a way that embraces the methodology and
true holding of that precedent.  And second, courts should more often
take on the difficult challenge of conducting a prong-one analysis to
define the right implicated in the issues of a given case.
Conscientious evaluation of presented issues against existing prece-
dent is not inherently objective, nor should we expect that most judges
can readily leave the culture wars and their personal political beliefs at
the door.  Nonetheless, when courts deliberately narrow and under-
mine a majority decision by framing that holding through the dissent,
they betray the weight of the precedent and they betray the parties
relying on them for predictable outcomes of law.  The Eighth Circuit,
for instance, hampered the ability of the Lathrop court to immediately
find that a constitutional right had been violated under the prong-one
analysis, because it had undermined the Lawrence holding by misin-
terpreting its reasoning.215
Even if courts were to engage more conscientiously with precedent
when analyzing qualified immunity defenses, the results may not al-
ways favor plaintiffs.  For instance, the Roberts Court’s move towards
treating government employment decisions as purely discretionary
without the need for a link to legitimate governmental purpose could
have a negative impact on cases like Gill, Lathrop, and Ambris.  Were
a court to continue to interpret sexual orientation rights as tied to
rational-basis scrutiny, that outcome would be nearly assured: there
would no longer be a clearly established right in play.
214. See generally Gill v. Devlin, 867 F. Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Tex. 2012); Ambris v. City of
Cleveland, No. 1:12CV774, 2012 WL 5874367 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2012); Lathrop v. City of St.
Cloud, Civil No. 10-2361 (DWF/LIB), 2012 WL 185780 (D. Minn. Jan 23, 2012).
215. See supra note 176.
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The key to avoiding such negative outcomes for plaintiffs is for
courts to employ the first prong of a qualified immunity analysis.  The
first prong requires the court to find a sufficient allegation that a con-
stitutional right has been violated,216 and if the courts conscientiously
examined the Romer and Lawrence holdings in a prong-one analysis,
they would see that the rights identified in those precedents do not
employ the traditional levels-of-scrutiny methodology.  They should
appreciate that Romer holds “that a state policy that treats people ad-
versely due to their sexual orientation requires at least some sort of
non-discriminatory, non-moralistic justification in order to be found
constitutional.”217  They should also accept that Lawrence provides
constitutional protection for individuals’ private sexual and moral
choices.218  Between these two powerful precedents, even purely dis-
cretionary actions of a government employer could not be based on
discriminatory or moralistic grounds related to that person’s sexual
orientation.  Therefore, even if rational basis included everything but
the purely irrational, sexual orientation discrimination could still be
unconstitutional because the Court has required that there be some-
thing more than moralistic grounds.
Another value of the prong-one analysis is demonstrated by the
Lathrop court, which faced the challenge of circuit precedent that did
not easily support a finding of clearly established law.219  By first en-
gaging prong one, the court was able to probe the question of whether
a right had been violated.220  Even though district courts in other cir-
cuits, like Gill in the Fifth Circuit, would have readily found the viola-
tion of equal protection in the Lathrop facts, the court was able to rule
that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there
was a right violation.221  The prong-one inquiry allowed the case to
stay active and no doubt helped the parties reach a settlement.222
It is tempting when reviewing how courts have misunderstood the
Romer and Lawrence decisions to criticize the Supreme Court deci-
sions for their avoidance of the traditional equal protection and due
process analyses.  The lack of levels-of-scrutiny language has indeed
provided an excuse for the lower courts to misinterpret and misapply
the holdings.  It is also tempting to call on Congress to enact legisla-
tion that would include sexual orientation as a classification protected
216. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
217. Leonard, supra note 40, at 535.
218. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
219. See generally Lathrop, 2012 WL 185780.
220. Id. at *6–7.
221. Id.
222. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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by civil rights laws like Title VII.  However, enough courts have cor-
rectly understood Romer and Lawrence as clearly established consti-
tutional protections for sexual minorities.
Rather, the problem in vindicating these rights in court lies with the
qualified immunity doctrine.  The Supreme Court’s growing mistrust
of anything short of a perfect consensus among circuits could allow
less conscientious courts to undermine these high-court precedents on
a national level.  Furthermore, because prong-one-only rulings can
create opportunities for both parties to appeal, district courts may be
reluctant to engage in the hard work of finding a violation when a
second-prong ruling that the violation was not clearly established
would more often close the dispute and avoid appeal.  If more district
courts engaged the law and key precedential cases directly to deter-
mine if a violation of a right had been alleged, the qualified immunity
doctrine could still serve our society by holding officials accountable
when they have indeed violated an individual’s clearly established
right.
V. CONCLUSION
Oliver Wendell Holmes called the law a body of “systematized pre-
diction.”223  For parties to have an ability to predict how the law will
treat their claims once a right is established through federal legislation
or Supreme Court precedent, the federal courts should be able to
evaluate the same facts in the same way regarding the elements of that
right.  Qualified immunity doctrine already applies this predictability
strongly in favor of a government defendant by requiring that he be
granted immunity against damages unless it can be shown that he vio-
lated a plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional right.  Even when
the right involves a topic caught up in the cultural wars, if the facts are
close enough to the defined law, the results should be predictable.
Therefore, when three cases on facts that easily sufficed for allega-
tions of equal protection violations came before three courts in three
different circuits in the same year and resulted in three different out-
comes, it is clear that there is a problem with the qualified immunity
doctrine.  Under the Roberts Court, the qualified immunity doctrine
has become more generous to defendants with an increasing require-
ment for circuit unanimity and an emerging approach to rational-basis
review that protects decisionmakers’ discretion.  The problems arising
in qualified immunity doctrine are particularly apparent when evalu-
ating constitutional rights related to sexual orientation, because the
223. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897).
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key Supreme Court cases did not rely wholly on the established meth-
odologies for equal protection and due process analysis.
In the hands of judges who unconscientiously apply precedent or
wish to avoid hot-button social policy topics, the qualified immunity
doctrine can prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their rights and fur-
ther weaken the “private attorney general” approach to rights claims.
During the civil rights era, the courts played a leading role in recogniz-
ing and expanding civil rights for people of color.  In this era of gay
civil rights, the courts should not be the slower and less reliable vehi-
cle for recognizing implicit rights.  If courts were to more regularly
apply the prong-one analysis of qualified immunity and faithfully ad-
here to the actual holdings of Supreme Court precedent, the law re-
lated to civil rights violations under § 1983 could provide both parties
with the predictability they need and deserve from the law.
Robin B. Wagner*
* J.D. Candidate 2014, DePaul University College of Law.  Thanks to the Editorial Boards of
Volumes 62 and 63 of the DePaul Law Review, and to Professors Susan Bandes and David
Franklin for their critiques and support.  I am grateful to Lambda Legal for the opportunity to
intern at the Midwest Regional Office during the summer of 2012, as that experience is where I
learned of the Gill v. Devlin case and became intrigued with this topic.  I dedicate this Comment
with love and appreciation to Suzanne and John Fox, Daniel Wagner, and Sharon Haar.
904 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:869
